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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT, AND 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
< < » ' I"1 
This appeal is taken from the provisions of a divorce 
decree, findings of fact, and conclusions oi law entered by Judge 
Philip R. Fishier in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Jurisdiction for appellate 
review of this case is conferred by Utah Code Annotated 7 8-2a-
3(g) which provides for appeals from Orlders rendered in the 
district court involving domestic relations cases. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 0N APPEAL 
1. Did the Trial Court err in failing to make 
findings on the issues of the best interests of the children and 
the respective parenting skills of the Appellant and Respondent 
and in generally failing to make adequate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law? 
2. Did the Trial Court err in deciding the issue of 
child custody at trial and then in failing to allow Appellant the 
right to present his case on that issue afid in failing to allow 
him to amend his Complaint pursuant to U.R.1C.P. 15(b). 
3. Did the Trial Court err in not making findings on 
the issue of the best interests of the children in view of 
Respondents plans to move the children out of state and in 
allowing her to do so? 
4. Was the Trial Court biased and predisposed to 
award custody to the Respondent? 
1 
5. Did the Trial Court err in not awarding child 
custody to Appellant in light of the clear preponderance of the 
evidence? 
6. Did the Trial Court err in not granting more 
liberal and practical visitation rights to the Appellant based 
upon the best interests of the children? 
7. Did the Trial Court err in awarding child support 
in the amount of $325.00 per child per month? 
8. Did the Trial Court err in its valuation and 
distribution of the marital assets of the parties? 
9. Should the Court of Appeals award the Appellant 
attorney's fees for the appeal? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Rule 15(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When 
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express 
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in 
the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may-
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence 
and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of 
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure 
so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of 
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial 
on the ground that it is not within the issues made by 
the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the 
objecting party to meet such evidence. 
30-3-10 Utah Code Ann. (1953): 
In any case of separation of husband and wife having 
minor children, or whenever a marriage is declared void 
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or dissolved the court shall make such order for the 
future care and custody of the mihor children as it may-
deem just and proper. In determining custody, the 
court shall consider the best interests of the child 
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards 
of each of the parties. The couirt may inquire of the 
children and take into considefation the children's 
desires regarding the future custody; however, such 
expressed desires shall not be controlling and the 
court may, nevertheless, determine the children's 
custody otherwise. 
U.R.C.P. 8(a) 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief, whether an original claim, counter-
claim, cross-claim or third party claim, 
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief; ... 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Sec. 1: 
Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
78-45-7(2) Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended]. 
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material 
change in circumstances has occurred, the court in 
determining the amount of prospective support, shall 
consider all relevant factors including but not limited 
to: 
a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties 
b) the relative wealth and income 
of the parties; 
c) the ability of the oblitjor to 
earn; 
d) the ability of the obligee to 
earn; 
e) the need of the obligee; 
f) the age of the parties; 
g) the responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASS 
This action was commenced in the Third Judicial 
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District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah by the 
filing of the divorce Complaint on June 11, 1985 (R. at 2). The 
parties had been married on June 19, 1976 and had as issue of 
that marriage two children, Anne Elizabeth Ebbert, born February 
14, 1980 and Amy Ebbert, born June 16, 1982. Each of the parties 
desired to be awarded custody of both children (R. at 2-15) and 
(R. at 25-26). 
At the time of the filing of the Divorce Complaint 
Appellant and Respondent were living in the same home. The 
following day Appellant moved approximately six city blocks from 
the home where he could be near the children (R. at 591, lines 18 
and 19). 
Appellant's Complaint asserted a request for liberal 
and minimum visitation rights upon the assumption that Respondent 
would remain in the Salt Lake area (R. at 3) . It was not until 
approximately the third week in September of 1985 that Appellant 
had any knowledge of Respondent's threats to leave the state with 
the children (R. at 578). In November of 1985 it was 
conclusively determined for the first time that Respondent in 
fact intended to and was proceeding with plans to leave the state 
(R. at 568). 
A stipulated settlement was proposed by the parties on 
November 7, 1985. The parties thereafter were unable to agree 
upon the form and the substance of Findings of Facts, Conclusions 
of Law, Judgment and Decree of Divorce due to the new evidence 
regarding plans to remove herself and the children from the state 
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(R. at 568 lines 5-8) as well as new evidence pertaining to asset 
values and liabilities (R. at 557 lines 4+7) Said stipulation 
was set aside in its entirety and the mattet was set for trial. 
This case came on for trial before the Honorable Philip 
R. Fishier, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for, Salt Lake County, State of Utah at thQ hour of 9:00 a.m. on 
Friday, November 18, 19 85. The Appellant and Respondent were 
both present and represented by counsel. 
During the pendency of the action five distinct 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law were proposed (R 68-83, 
115-129, 153-164, 229-239, 255-265), as well as five distinct 
Judgments and Decree(s) of Divorce (R. 84-94, 100-113, 142-152, 
215-228, 241-254). Appeal is taken from the final judgment and 
decree of divorce entered with the Court May 16, 1986 (R. 241-
254). 
It is the contention of the Appellant that the Judgment 
rendered was completely unfair and inequitable, reflecting a 
distinct bias of the Court and denying Appellant and his children 
their constitutional and parental rights. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Court awarded custody to Respondent with $650 per 
month child support while the Appellant had a net income of 
$2,000 per month including the value of a company-provided car. 
Over 97% of the marital estate was awarded to the Respondent. 
Child visitation was granted to Appellant of three 
weeks during the summer and alternate holiday weekends. The 
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Court knew that the Respondent was moving to Colorado immediately 
after the trial but did not deem that fact to be relevant. The 
Respondent agreed that Appellant was a good father whom the 
children loved. 
The Court did not make any findings with respect to the 
best interests of the children either generally nor with respect 
to the proposed move to Colorado. 
The Respondent had been treated for emotional problems 
and it is the factual claim of the Appellant that the clear 
weight of the evidence shows that the best interests of the 
children would be best served by awarding custody to the 
Appellant. Citations to the record are made in great detail in 
the sections of the brief covering the respective issues. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Trial Court erred in failing to make findings 
on the issues of the best interests of the children and the 
respective parenting skills of the Appellant and Respondent and 
because generally there are no adequate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
2. A new trial should be granted pursuant to U.R.C.P. 
15(b) on the issue of child custody because the Court tried the 
issue, but failed to allow the Appellant his right to present his 
case on that issue, and failed to allow him to Amend his 
pleadings. 
3. The Trial Court erred in not making findings on 
the issue of the best interests of the children in view of 
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Respondent's plans to move the children out of state and in 
allowing her to do so. 
4. A new trial should be granted because the Court 
was biased and predisposed to award custody to the Respondent. 
5. The Trial Court erred in not awarding child 
custody to Appellant in light of the clear preponderance of the 
evidence. 
6. The Trial Court erred in not granting more liberal 
and practical visitation rights to the Appellant based upon the 
best interests of the children. 
7. The Trial Court erred in awarding child support in 
the amount of $325.00 per child per month. 
8. The Trial Court erred iri its valuation and 
distribution of the marital assets of the parties. 
9. The Court of Appeals should award the Appellant 
attorney's fees for the appeal. 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
MAKE FINDINGS ON THE ISSUE1 OF THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN AND 
THE RESPECTIVE PARENTING SKILLS OF 
THE APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT AND 
BECAUSE GENERALLY THERE ARE NO 
ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FA£T AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
The only reference in the Findings of Fact to parental 
fitness is in paragraph 4. 
Two children have been born the issue of 
the marriage: Anne Ebbert, born February 14, 
1980, and Amy Ebbert, born June 16, 1982. 
The Defendant is a good mother apd a fit and 
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proper person to have the care, custody and 
control of said children. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that such 
findings are insufficient and that such a case must be remanded 
for further proceedings. 
In Martinez v. Martinez, (Utah 1986) 728 P.2d 994 Page 
994 et. seq. the Utah Supreme Court, Per Curium, stated: 
No finding was made as to the relative 
parenting abilities of the parties or the 
best interest of the child. Defendant argues 
that this finding above is insufficient to 
support the custody award or to permit 
meaningful review on appeal. We agree. 
The finding which the Utah Court determined was 
insufficient in Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986) was 
almost identical in wording to the finding in this case. The 
Supreme Court quoted the Smith finding as follows: 
4. During the course of the marriage 
the parties had born as their issue on minor 
child... The Court finds that Plaintiff is a 
fit and proper person to be awarded the care, 
custody and control of said minor child, 
subject to the Defendant's reasonable rights 
of visitation. 
The Court went on to say: 
The fact that we may review the evidence 
and make our own findings in equity matters 
cannot serve as an excuse for the failure 
below to furnish adequate findings to ensure 
that the trial court's discretionary 
determination was rationally based. 
As stated in Smith v. Smith, Supra,: 
[I]f our r e v i e w of c u s t o d y 
determinations is to be anything more than a 
superficial exercise of judicial power, the 
record on review must contain written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law by 
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the trial judge which specially s&t forth the 
reasons, based on those numerous factors 
which must be weighed in determining "the 
best interests of the child," and which 
support the custody decision... [t]he factors 
relied on by our trial judge in awarding 
custody must be articuable and articulated in 
the judge's written findings and conclusions. 
726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986) 
A mere finding that the parties are or 
are not "fit and proper persons to be awarded 
the care, custody and control" <^£ the child 
cannot pass muster when the custody award is 
challenged and an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion is urged on appeal. 
In Martinc z, Supra, the award of custody was vacated 
and the case was remanded for appropriate Additional findings of 
fact. 
It is strongly recommended that in this matter that as 
respecting this issue the case be remanded for a new trial on the 
following grounds: 
1. The Trial Judge has retired from the 
bench. 
2. That the failure to enter appropriate 
findings combined with the oth^r problems 
discussed in this Brief require in the very-
least a new trial. 
II. 
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED 
PURSUANT TO U.R.C.P. 15(b) ON THE 
ISSUE OF CHILD CUSTODY BECAUSE THE 
COURT TRIED THE ISSUE, BUT FAILED 
TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO 
PRESENT HIS CASE ON THAT ISSUE, AND 
FAILED TO ALLOW HIM TO AMEND HIS 
PLEADINGS. 
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A . 
CUSTODY WAS ALWAYS AN I S S U E AS 
RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS 
The record demonstrates that custody was an issue. 
The Appellant stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his 
Complaint as follows: 
4» Defendant should be awarded the care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor children subject to the 
Defendant's right to liberal visitation at minimum as 
follows: 
a. Every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until 
Sunday at 6:00 p.m.; 
b. One night during the week from 6:00 p.m. until 
9:00 p.m.; 
c. Every other red-letter holiday (e.g. July 4th, 
Labor Day, etc.,) from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m.; 
d. All day on alternate Thanksgiving Day; 
e. With Defendant on Christmas Eve and until noon on 
Christmas day and with Plaintiff from noon on Christmas Day 
and for the four (4) following days; 
f. Half day on each child's birthday; 
g. All day with Defendant on Mother's Day and with 
Plaintiff on Father's Day; 
h. For one week for each month of the minor 
children's summer vacation for a minimum of three (3) weeks. 
i. Any other visitation as mutually-agreed upon by 
both parties hereto (R. at 2). 
5. Plaintiff should be allowed to retain all parental 
entitlements with the parties minor children as if the 
parties were not divorced, such as the right to attend 
parent/teacher conference, and to receive notice of illness 
or injury to child (R. at 2). 
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It was the Appellant's intent in these paragraphs to 
place child custody in issue if he were not granted those 
visiting rights. The visitation rights requested were so 
extensive that this was tantamount to requesting joint custody. 
As of the date of the Complaint, June 10
 f 1985, both 
Appellant and Respondent were residents of Salt Lake City, and 
Appellant thought it was Respondent's intent to remain in Salt 
Lake City (R. at 578). 
The Respondent placed these qi^estions in issue by-
filing the following response in her answer} 
2. Paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of 
the Plaintiff's Complaint are denied (R. at 12). 
The Respondent also filed a Counterclaim, but made no 
reference to child custody in the body of her Counterclaim (R. at 
12, 13). Thus Respondent violated U.R.C.P. 8(a) which requires: 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether 
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party 
claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; ... 
Conspicuously absent from the Respondent's Counterclaim 
is any language setting forth reasons why the Respondent should 
be entitled to custody and, notably, the customary language to 
the effect that the party so pleading is d fit and proper party 
to have custody of the minor children of the* parties. 
Respondent's Counterclaim make|s reference to child 
custody only in paragraph 2b of the prayer which states: 
b. Awarding to her the care, custody, and control of 
the minor children who are issue of the marriage, reserving 
to the Plaintiff the right to visit with said children at 
all reasonable times and places (R. at 14). 
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The Respondents reply contained a general denial as 
follows: 
W h e r e f o r e , P l a i n t i f f p r a y s t h a t D e f e n d a n t ' s 
Counterc la im be d i smissed and she t a k e noth ing the reby (R. 
a t 2 5 ) . 
Thus, the question of child custody was in issue. 
The parties purported to enter into a stipulation 
covering all issues of the divorce including granting custody to 
Respondent (R. at 302-314). 
The Court set this stipulation aside entirely in its 
minute entry on March 3, 1986 quoted as follows: 
Court orders that the stipulation is set aside. A 
trial will be held on March 27, 1986 at 9:00 A.M. (R. at 
205). 
Therefore, child custody was again placed in issue. 
There was nothing decided between the date the stipulation was 
set aside on March 3, 1986 and the date of the trial. The Court 
nevertheless stated the following at the commencement of the 
trial: 
The Court: All right. The Court has previously ruled 
on the issues of Jurisdiction, Grounds and Custody I 
believe. (R. at 406 Lines 9-11). 
B. 
CUSTODY WAS TRIED 
The Court must have changed its mind as to whether it 
had decided custody prior to trial since it purported to decide 
the issue at the conclusion of the trial as evidenced by its 
minute entry quoted in part as follows: 
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Defendant is awarded the custody of the children and 
support of $325.00 per month per child, alimony of $1.00 a 
year for two years, the home and furnishings, the Buick ans 
[sic] what items she now has, plus her attorneys costs. 
(R. at 208) 
The fact that the Court decided iihis issue pursuant to 
the trial is further demonstrated in the Findings of Facts 
wherein the Court states: 
4. Two children have been born the issue of the 
marriage: Anne Ebbert, born Feb. 14, 1980, and Amy Ebbert, 
born June 16, 1982. The Defendant i^ a good mother and a 
fit and proper person to have the car^, custody and control 
of said two children (R. at 256-257). 
Further evidence that custody was tried is set forth in 
the Court's Conclusions of Law as follows: 
2. The care, custody and control of the two minor 
children who are issue of the marriage should be granted to 
Defendant, (R. at 262). 
Some of the testimony which was allowed at trial on the 
issue of child custody is set forth as follows: 
Q: And what did she tell you? 
A: That if I did not give her everything she 
wanted, she would use her parents1 money to 
take the children so far away I would never 
see them. 
(R. at 578, lines 18-21) 
Q: And what were you discussing at that time? 
A: The same thing. 
Q: And what was said to yob at that time? 
A: If I did not give her everything she wanted, 
she would be using her parents1 money to make 
sure that I never savf the children again. 
And I believe at that point she had mentioned 
Europe. 
Q: Any other conversations of that substance? 
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A: Not off the top of my head, no. Those stuck 
pretty well. 
(R. at 579, lines 11-18) 
A: Well, we know where children usually go in 
this state in a divorce. They go to Mama, 
and I knew that Barbara's parents with their 
millions of dollars would give her whatever 
she wanted and that her threat could be 
carried through without any problem at all 
and there was not a thing I could do about 
it. 
(R. at 579, lines 23-25, and R. at 580, lines 1-3) 
The following was heard regarding parental skills and 
the best interest of the children: 
Q: (By Mr. Hanson) Mr. Ebbert, Mrs. Ebbert testified 
that she felt that you had excellent parenting 
skills; that you were good with the children; that 
you had a good relationship, and these kind of 
things. Do you agree with her characterization of 
your relationship with the kids and your abilities 
as a parent? 
A: She has said repeatedly that I'm the best father 
she's ever seen, and I agree with her. 
Q: What do you do with the children when you've been 
visiting with them? 
A: This week we went to the zoo, went up and saw the 
animals and played with them. And we read a 
couple of books. I have pretty much taught them 
to read. I have been helping Anne with her math. 
We've got workbooks, and they come over and they 
can't wait to get their workbooks out to learn how 
to read and write, add, subtract -- got Ann 
dividing now. 
Take them to the museum up at the university of 
Utah. We go to the park and play, fly kites, 
church. 
Q: Do you do anything fun with them? 
A: It sounds silly, but I've always felt like maybe 
the best example a parent can show a child is 
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their time. 
Q: And you enjoy the time spent with them? 
A: Absolutely. And I always have, because this stuff 
didn't start after the separation. 
(R. at 618, lines 13-25, and R. at 619, lin^s 1-13) 
As to provisions for the children the transcript reads: 
A. Well, as Mr. Cowley pointed out, I have no idea 
where child support is going to end, and I hope in 
July I'm going to be able to move out of the 
apartment and into the house, the rental property. 
At that point I have to incur a bedroom set for 
the children. I have a washer and dryer, I have a 
refrigerator I have to purchase — like that. 
(R. at 612, lines 19-25) 
Discussion regarding a specific visitation schedule was 
heard at R. at 582, lines 10-22. 
Further evidence heard relating t|D custody reads: 
A. We really have not had a problem with the 
visitation scenario, other than items like Barbara 
not being there, the kids not being ready. And 
then they are demanding that I make another trip 
back over to deliver them. If I refuse, I get to 
keep them for another night Which tickles the heck 
out of me so I don't care on that. But I do want 
it as specific as possible. 
(R. at 583) 
C. 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED 
EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF CHILD 
CUSTODY 
Since the record shows that child custody was not 
decided before trial, was not stipulated to and was decided at 
trial, the court was obligated to allow Appellant to introduce 
all admissible evidence which he offered and to hold a 
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preliminary hearing on child custody. This the Court failed to 
do. 30-3-10 U.C.A. (1953) provides that the Court must fully 
consider the best interests of the children: 
In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral 
standards of each of the parties. 
The Court deliberately excluded testimony and evidence 
as demonstrated in the trial transcript in the following 
respects: 
Q: (by-
Mr. Hanson): But you understand that in so doing, that the 
children are going to be leaving someone 
behind who's very important in their life?" 
A:(Respondent) 
That someone may see them anytime he wishes. 
(R. at 523, lines 7-10) 
The questioning continued 
The Court: But you understand that its going to be more 
difficult for Mr. Ebbert to see them in terms 
of frequency when they're living in Colorado, 
as opposed to living in Salt Lake? 
Mr. Cowley: I object, Your Honor. This is just a waste 
of time. We acknowledged you can drive to 
Denver. 
The Court: Sustained. 
(R. at 523, lines 11-17) 
With respect to the beneficiaries of Appellant's life 
insurance policy the following discussion was held: 
Q. (by Mr. 
Hanson) You want to provide for the kids in the event 
of your death, do you not? 
A. Absolutely. And if -- if everything were 
paid to Barbara — 
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Mr. Cowley: Now w a i t a minu te I'ljL o b j e c t . T h a t ' s not 
responsive to any questions asked. 
The Court: Sustained. 
(R. at 560, lines 5-11) 
The Court prevented further testimony with respect to 
the effects of the Respondent's move out of state upon both the 
children and the Appellant shown at R. at 568, lines 22-25, and 
R. at 165, lines 1-10. 
Where Mr. Hanson asked the Appellant a question with 
regard to the Respondent's care, parenting techniques and quality 
of care she gives the children, Mr. Cowley's following objection 
was sustained: 
Mr. Cowley: I am going to object because I think this is 
all irrelevant and immaterial, a big waste of 
time. 
(R. at 691, lines 22-24) 
The court had a duty to allow complete 
pursuant to Rule 15(b). The first part of Rule 15(b) 
the following: 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings 
as may be necessary to cause theta to conform 
to the evidence and to raise these issues may 
be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of 
these issues. 
In refusing the evidence and testimony regarding child 
custody the court effectively precluded bpth Appellant and the 
evidence 
provides 
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children from their constitutional rights to due process and 
equal protection. U.S. Cont. amend XIV §1: 
nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
In Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 652 (1975) 
the Supreme stated: 
[A] father, no less than a mother, has a 
constitutionally protected right to the 
"companionship, care, custody, and 
management" of the children he has sired and 
raised. 
Since the Court would not hear the evidence relative to 
a child custody award there must have been some presumption of 
the Court upon which the award was made. In the case of Vlandis 
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452, (1973) the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that it is a denial of due process to make: 
a permanent and irrebuttable presumption... 
When that presumption is not necessarily or 
universally true in fact, and when the state 
has a reasonable alternative means of making 
the crucial determination. 
In the case at hand a reasonable alternative means of 
making such a crucial determination as the award of child custody 
would have been to allow all relevant evidence and testimony at 
trial. 
D. 
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED ON THE 
ISSUE OF CHILD CUSTODY BECAUSE THE COURT 
ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
AMEND HIS COMPLAINT AS PROVIDED FOR IN 
U.R.C.P. 15(b). 
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The second part of Rule 15(b) bf the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides that: 
...If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the. pleadings to be amended 
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting pftrty fails to satisfy 
the court that the admission of sluch evidence would 
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the 
merits. The court shall grant a conti nuance, if necessary, 
to enable the objecting party to meet $uch evidence. 
The following discussion was had at trial and 
demonstrates that in the instant case evidjence was presented at 
trial and was objected to at the trial on tjhe ground that it was 
not within the issues made by the pleadingts. It also evidences 
the appropriate motion which was made by qounsel in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 15(b) to amend the pleadings to 
conform to the evidence: 
The Court: 
Mr. Hanson: 
Is custody an issue? 
Your Honor, the reason I feel t ha t I have to 
go fo rward w i t h thi& f o u n d a t i o n i s t o 
p r e se rve the record on t h i s as to the fact 
t ha t she ' s moving to Colorado, and obviously 
w e ' r e not t h r i l l e d about t h a t and I think 
tha t we need t o e s t a b l i s h the reasons why 
we're not . 
The Court: 
Mr. Hanson: 
Mr. Cowley: 
answered Answer this question--Can only be 
"Yes" or "No". Is custody an issue? 
Yes. 
May I r e s p o n d by c a l l i n g t h e C o u r t ' s 
a t t en t i on to the Complaint t h a t they f i l e d 
where t h e i r only a l l ega t ion i s tha t custody-
should be awarded to the Defendant; and if he 
wants to change custody games, i t s a l i t t l e 
l a t e . 
The Court: Where did you put custody an issue? 
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Mr. Hanson: Today. 
The Court: 
Mr. Hanson: 
The Court: 
Mr. Hanson: 
The Court: 
Mr. Hanson: 
The Court: 
Mr. Hanson: 
The Court: 
Mr. Hanson 
And the pleadings are framed so that — as 
far as I can see, the pleadings are framed 
that there's no dispute that the Defendant 
should have custody. When we thought the 
case would settle, had settled, the Defendant 
was to have custody. 
That's right. 
And that today you want to make custody an 
issue? 
That's correct. 
Alright. You made your record. 
May I say why and what my intention is? 
Yes. 
My i n t e n t i o n i s t h i s : t h i s complaint was 
f i l e d , I b e l i e v e in June or July of 1985; 
t h a t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s h a v e c h a n g e d 
dramatically in terms of what we had in our 
knowledge a t tha t t ime; and tha t if I am able 
to lay , by testimony of Mr. Ebbert, h i s 
concerns regarding custody, t ha t I would 
of c o u r s e , s u b j e c t t o Your H o n o r ' s 
r u l i n g thereon, make a motion to amend 
t h e p l e a d i n g s t o conform w i t h t h e 
e v i d e n c e t h a t ' s been brought f o r t h . 
That i s the purpose of answering your 
q u e s t i o n a f f i r m a t i v e l y t h a t , y e s , 
custody i s an i s sue , Your Honor. 
Al r igh t . Well I am not going to allow you to 
amend the pleadings a t t h i s l a t e d a t e . If 
custody were an i s s u e , you could have had 
evaluat ions done, home s tud ies done. We have 
not done any of t h a t , so I wi l l sus ta in the 
ob j ec t i on . This move to Colorado I d o n ' t 
bel ieve i s nearly as s ign i f i can t as you do, I 
guess, Mr. Hanson. Proceed. 
May I then go forward regarding the - - Mr. 
Cowley's object ion regarding what I expect t o 
e l i c i t from Mr. Ebbert about the qua l i ty of 
the care and the nature of the care in Mrs. 
Ebber t ' s custody? 
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The Court: None--
Mr. Hanson: What I'm wondering: Aire you sustaining his 
objection and cutting me off? 
The Court: Sustaining the objection. Custody is not an 
issue. She — I believe in her pleadings you 
say she should be the custodial parent. The 
last time we tried to settle the case he said 
she should be the custodial parent. I think 
that's it. 
(R. at 619, line 25 - R. at 622, line 7) 
Since custody was an issue and Respondent's counsel 
objected upon the ground that the issue was not raised within the 
pleadings, the Court should have allowed the motion to amend the 
pleadings to conform to the evidence ^nd a continuance if 
necessary as set forth in the conclusonaty provision of Rule 
15(b) which states: 
...the court shall grant a continuance if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to 
meet such evidence. 
In the case of Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. 
Commodities, (CA 8th, 1982) 668 F.2d 1193 a rule 15(b) motion was 
permitted even after the close of evidenc^. Brown v. Ward, (A 
4th, 1970] 438 F.2d 1285 holds that pleadings may be amended even 
after verdict to make them conform to the proof. 
In the case of General Insurance Company v. Carnicero 
Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502 the Supreme COurt of Utah held that 
where an issue was tried by implied consent, the trial court 
erred in denying defendants ' motion to amend their answer in 
order to conform to the evidence. 
On January 8, 1987 the Suprem^ Court of New York, 
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Appellate Division, Third Department found that the Supreme 
Court, Trial Term, erred when it denied Appellant's motion to 
conform the pleadings to the proof, which motion was made at the 
end of the trial. Judgment was reversed, and the matter remitted 
to the Supreme Court for a new trial. See Jean F. O'Sullivan, 
Appellant, v. John J. 0'Sullivan, Respondent, 510 NYS, 2nd p.288. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING 
FINDINGS ON THE ISSUE OF THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN IN VIEW 
OF RESPONDENTS PLANS TO MOVE THE 
CHILDREN OUT OF STATE AND IN 
ALLOWING HER TO DO SO. 
The Respondent told the Appellant during the divorce 
proceedings that if he didn't give her what she wanted by-
stipulation that she would take the children so far away that he 
would not be able to visit them. The Appellant declined and the 
Respondent took the children to Colorado Springs. 
The Appellant testified as follows at trial: 
Q: (By Mr. 
Hanson) And what did she tell you? 
A: (By Mr. 
Ebbert) That if I did not give her everything she 
wanted, she would use her parents* money to 
take the children so far away I would never 
see them. 
Q: Now, did this similar type of discussion take 
place on another occasion? 
A: Yes. 
Q: When would t h a t have been? 
A: I w o u l d g u e s s N o v e m b e r , f i r s t p a r t of 
November, f i r s t and middle of November. 
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Q Of 1985? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Where were you? 
A: In the residence. 
Q: Who was present? 
A: Barbara and I. 
Q: And what were you discu$sing at that time? 
A: The same thing. 
Q: And what was said to you at that time? 
A: If I did not give her everything she wanted, 
she would be using her parents• money to make 
sure that I never saw the children again. 
And I believe at that point she had mentioned 
Europe. 
Q: Any other conversations of that substance? 
A: Not off the top of my head, no. Those stuck 
pretty well. 
Q: And what was your state of mind after hearing 
that from Mrs. Ebbert? 
A: Total frustration. 
Q: In what regard? 
A: Well, we know where cjhildren usually go in 
this state in a divorce. They go to Mama, 
and I knew that Barbara's parents with their 
millions of dollars would give her whatever 
she wanted and that her threat could be 
carried through without any problem at all 
and there was not a thing I could do about 
it. 
at 578 Line 18 to R. at 580 Line 3) 
This testimony went wholly uncontradicted by the 
pondent. 
Mrs. Ebbert was actually planning and did in fact move 
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to Colorado shortly after the trial. 
Q. (By Mr, Hanson) Mr. Ebbert, in light of the 
fact -- based on what you have said under my 
examination, in light of the fact that Mrs. 
Ebbert appears inevitably as going to 
Colorado, you feel that it's important to lay 
down a specific visitation schedule? 
A. Absolutely. 
(R. at 582 Lines 10-15) 
The law in Utah and the majority rule is that a child 
should not be removed from the jurisdiction of the Court which is 
hearing the divorce proceedings and that prior to any proposed 
removal a specific finding must be made that it is in the best 
interests of the child to do so. 
The Court in the Findings of Fact made only the 
following statement regarding custody: 
23. The Defendant (Respondent/Wife) 
currently resides in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, but is 
intending to move during the summer of 1986 to Colorado Springs. 
No finding whatsoever was made on the important issue 
as to whether or not it was in the best interests of the children 
to be taken to Colorado. 
The law on this point is discussed at length in 
McGonigle v. McGoniqle, 112 Colo. 569, 151 P.2d 977 at page 978. 
Where the custody of a child is awarded in a 
divorce proceeding, the child becomes the ward of the 
court, and it is against the policy of the law to 
permit its removal to another jurisdiction unless its 
well-being and future welfare would be better subserved 
thereby. State ex rel. Shoemaker v. Hall, Mo. Sup., 
257 S,W. 1047. While ordinarily the custody of a child 
should not be awarded to a nonresident, nor to one 
contemplating immediate removal from the state, it, 
nevertheless, is well established that when it is 
conducive to the child's best interests, the court may 
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permit it to be removed from the jurisdiction. Williams 
v. Williams, 110 Colo. 473, 135 P.2d 1016, 1019. See, 
also, Fouts v. Pendrick, 111 Colo- 141, 137 P.2d 1019, 
and Fateir v. Hugg, 112 Colo. 213, 147 P.2d 477. The 
sum of the doctrine announced in the Missouri case and 
in our decisions, is illuminatingl 
C.J.S., Divorce, page 1179, /313.. 
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In affirming an 
order of removal of the child involved in the Williams 
case to another jurisdiction we were at pains to 
emphasize the fact that the "learned trial judge at all 
times proceeded upon the principle that best interest 
of the child should be the controlling factor in 
determining the placing of her custody," and resolved 
the issue on that premise. Under this established rule 
and the circumstances attending, the motion for removal 
of the child to another jurisdiction should have been 
denied, and, subject to what we shall say in the next 
paragraph, that will be the order on remand. 
There is not an abundance of Uta^ i law on this subject 
and the time is ripe for a further elaboration by the Court on 
this issue. 
Utah seems to subscribe to the majority view as 
expressed by the Colorado Court in McGOnigle, Supra as was 
expressed by Justice Crockett in Curry v. ^urry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 
321 P.2d 939 at pages 942 and 943 (1958). 
The precept is well recognized that the trial 
court is vested with broad equitable powers in divorce 
matters and that its judgment will not be disturbed 
lightly, nor at all unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates against his findings, or there has been a 
est injustice or 
rule, it is our 
plain abuse of discretion, or a mani 
inequity is wrought. Applying suchj 
conclusion that the judgment should be affirmed, but 
with this modification: The plaintiff should be 
required to retain the children in this jurisdiction 
until the further order of court so that the defendant 
may enjoy full privileges, of visiting and maintaining 
the best possible paternal relationship with them." 
The lower court misperceived the law on this point when 
it stated: 
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As I understand it, she can relocate if she wants 
to move to Colorado Springs because she likes mountains 
on the west side of the valley as opposed to living 
here and having them on the east side of the valley 
that would seem that's appropriate. She can move where 
she wants to move. (Judge Fishier R. at 569 lines 21-25 
through R. at 570 line 1). 
And I understand the situation. It's a bad 
situation, but it kind of goes without saying. We're 
in the middle of a divorce. We just have to work 
something out. I will just have to fashion an order 
that's going to take that into account. I'd be 
surprised if he were happy with the situation. (Judge 
Fishier R. at 570 lines 2-7). 
The Court should enter the same order that was entered 
in the Curry case requiring that the children be maintained in 
this jurisdiction or it should reverse and grant custody to the 
Appellant. 
IV. 
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED 
BECAUSE THE COURT WAS BIASED AND 
PREDISPOSED TO AWARD CUSTODY TO THE 
RESPONDENT. 
It is apparent from the Affidavit of attorney Kenn M. 
Hanson (appended hereto) that the Court was predisposed to award 
custody to the Respondent. 
Commentary in the publication Criteria for Deciding 
Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 Fam. L.Q.I 
(Spring 1984), at page 41 provides: 
On a subject as fundamentally important as 
the custody and welfare of children, each 
case on appeal should receive close scrutiny. 
A careful review is especially important 
since a custody determination may be 
influenced by the biases of the trial judge. 
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In the case of In re; Marriage of Murray, 622 P.2d 
1288, 1291 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) the Court found that if the 
judge's comments suggest an improper bias, there is strong need 
for independent review of the case by the Appellate Court. 
Further commentary regarding Coujrt bias from Criteria 
for Deciding Child Custody, supra, page 3 includes: 
..And for judges, custody cases bring 
forth more of their emotion and personal 
background than almost any other type of case 
they deal with. 
The trial transcript reflects the Court bias in the 
following instances: 
At the commencement of trial the pourt stated: 
All right. The Court has previously ruled on 
the issues of jurisdiction, grounds and 
custody, I believe. 
(R. at 406) 
This was notwithstanding the ojbvious dissention as 
shown by the fact that four previous findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were entered with the Court but were unable to 
be effectuated (R. at 68-83, 115-129, 153-164, and 229-239). 
Similarly, a stipulated settlement had to be set aside in its 
entirety as the parties were unable to agrde (R. at 205). 
The Court further expressed its tiias as follows: 
This move to Colorado I don't believe is as 
important as you do, I guess, Mr. Hanson. 
Proceed. 
(R. at 621, lines 19-20) 
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V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
AWARDING CHILD CUSTODY TO APPELLANT 
IN LIGHT OF THE CLEAR PREPONDERANCE 
OF THE EVIDENCE. 
In the case of Tanttila v. Tanttila, (Colo. 1965) 382 
P.2d 798 the Colorado Supreme Court reversed an order of the 
lower court which had granted the mother the right to remove the 
children to another state. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado found two factors to be 
of paramount importance: 
1. The children's feelings for their father, and 
2. How the removal may a f f e c t t h e f a t h e r ' s 
a b i l i t y to v i s i t the ch i ld ren . 
The Court in Tanttila , Supra, said at page 800: 
The mother testified concerning the 
relationship between the father and the 
children as follows: 
They love him very much. He loves them. 
*** I have told you that they loved their 
father and they have been very happy to be 
with him here. 
The Respondent Mrs. Ebbert, testified to the same 
effect. She said: 
Q. (By Mr. 
Hanson): You said that Ed is a good father. There's 
no question about his abilities? 
A. (By Mrs. 
Ebbert) No. 
Q. Does he have a close relationship with the 
children? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Does he read to them and help them with 
homework, and these kind of things? 
A. Yes, I believe he does. 
Q. Would you say that the kids love their 
father? 
A, Yes, they do. 
(R. at 521 line 18 to R. at 522 line 3) 
Q. (By Mr. 
Hanson): I s i t b e n e f i c i a l , in your o p i n i o n , Mrs. 
E b b e r t , t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n h a v e t h a t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h i s type of r e l a t i onsh ip tha t 
you've described, with t h e i r fa ther? 
A. (By Mrs. 
Ebbert): I think they need to be with their father, 
but I think they need to be with me. 
(R. at 522 lines 14-18) 
Mr. Ebbert was of the opinion that a move to Colorado 
would effectively preclude his ability to visit the children. 
Q. (By Mr. 
Hanson): In the event that Mrs. Ebbert does move to 
Colorado -- and it certainly sounds like she 
will -- who do you think should bear the 
expense of having the children come and see 
you? 
A. (By Mr. 
Ebbert): If I have to bear it, the children won't see 
me. 
(R. at 570 Lines 8-12) 
Under exactly these circumstances the Court in Tanttila 
concluded that it was an abuse of discretion to allow the mother 
to take the children out of state. This Court should so rule. 
In the case of Hale v Hale, 429 NE 2d. 340 the 
Massachusetts Court of Appeals reviewed a decision by the lower 
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court on the issue of custodial parent removal. It noted that 
even though the findings on this issue were extensive the lower 
court had not considered all of the relevant factors and remanded 
the case for further proceedings. The court outlined seven 
issues which should be considered. They are set forth and 
discussed as follows: 
1. The integrity of the motives of the custodial 
parent (page 344). 
Here it has been shown that Respondent, Mrs. Ebbert, 
had an improper motive in that she was using this as a threat to 
gain her terms of settlement. 
2. The children's attachment to community and 
relatives therein (page 342). 
The children, Anne age 6 and Amy age 4, had lived in 
the same neighborhood all of their lives (R. at 257). They had a 
good relationship with the Appellant's parents (R. at 336). They 
had a good relationship with their friends and neighborhood 
children (R. at 455 and R. at 434). Ann was attending school at 
Rowland Hall (R. at 455) and Amy was in preschool (R. at 434). 
3. The well-being of the custodial parent. 
The only testimony on this subject other than that 
previously cited was that the Respondent moved to Colorado to be 
nearer to her parents. 
The Respondent testified that she was having 
significant emotional problems. Her well-being would be best 
subserved by not having the responsibility of two young minor 
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children. Her testimony regarding her ^motional problems is 
quoted as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. 
Hanson) Now, why did you go see Linnel? What was the 
reason for going to see her originally? 
A. (By Mrs. 
Ebbert) I couldn't talk right. 
Q. You were referred to her by a physician, 
weren' t you? 
A. Yes. A neurosurgeon. tLt was stress. 
Q. You were having problems; you had gone to see 
t h e n e u r o s u r g e o n b e c a u s e y o u w e r e 
expe r i enc ing problems, r i g h t ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that you in fact copld not speak and --? 
A. I was blanking out, yes,. 
Q. That's the reason why you were referred to 
Linnel, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And were these sessions geared toward helping you 
with that particular problem? 
A. Originally, yes. 
(R. at 500, lines 15-25 and R. at 501, lines 1-7) 
4. Prospective advantages of quality of life in the 
new community (page 344). 
The only evidence on this question was that there were 
some children in the new neighborhood of the same age and that 
there would be a new elementary school in the fall of 1987. (R. 
at 511, 512). Certainly this does not show any prospective 
advantage of life in the new community. 
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5. The desires of the children (page 345). 
No evidence was received (R. at 624). 
6. Can visitation and support be made to meet the 
needs of the noncustodial parent and child for good contact? 
(Page 342). 
This issue was not considered in the Findings or 
Conclusions. Mr. Ebbert said a move would make visitation 
impossible (R. at 570). 
7. Will the custodial parent abide by the visitation 
schedule? (page 344). 
The Appellant had already had some problems with 
visitation (R. at 583 and R. at 575). This Court should adopt 
the Massachusetts standard and find that the Respondent has 
failed to meet it since there are no findings on any of these 
issues. 
Since the presumption is that the children should 
remain within the state of the jurisdiction of the Court unless 
and until the custodial parent shows that it would be in the best 
interests of the children to be removed from the state the Court 
should reverse and grant custody of the children to the Appellant 
because the record is devoid of evidence and findings to support 
an exception to the general rule. Failing that the case should 
be remanded for a new trial on this issue. 
An examination of the foregoing citations and the 
record in general demonstrates that the Appellant is clearly the 
better parent to have custody under the circumstances and it is 
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in the best interests of the children that he should be granted 
custody. 
VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
GRANTING MORE LIBERAL AND PRACTICAL 
VISITATION RIGHTS TO THE APPELLANT 
BASED UPON THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILDREN 
Exhibit "A" to the Divorce Decree sets forth visitation 
rights and essentially grants the following visitation rights. 
1. Three weeks in the summer. 
2. Alternating official holiday weekends throughout 
the year. 
It also provides: 
The Plaintiff is expected to dxercise the 
visitation rights herein granted to him in a 
reasonable and responsible fashion. If the 
children are ill or if there are other valid 
reasons why the defendant believes a 
particular visitation is not in the best 
interest of the children or will be hazardous 
or threatening to their physical or mental 
health then the Defendant may decline the 
visitation rights by giving reasonable 
written notice thereof to the plaintiff and 
setting forth the reason therefore. 
This determination essentially allows visitation at the 
sole discretion of the Respondent. 
The Appellant asks that the Court exercise its 
equitable powers and take judicial notice of the following facts 
from his affidavit attached hereto. 
1. That the Respondent claiming the benefit of the 
foregoing clause has verbally declined th^ Appellant visitation 
rights on fourteen occasions. 
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2. That if Appellant brings the children to his home 
in Midvale to visit them it costs him $588.00 per weekend. 
3. If he visits them in a motel in Colorado Springs 
it costs him $240.00 per weekend. 
The Court found that the Appellant was making $2,000.00 
net per month including his car (R. at 330, lines 1-2). 
Based upon these circumstances it is essentially 
impossible for the Appellant to visit the children on weekends 
and therefore his visitation is limited to three weeks per year. 
Courts have consistently held that it is error to order 
that the right of visitation shall be at the discretion of the 
person having custody of the child. Willey v Willeyf 253 Iowa 
1294, 115 NW2d 833; McCourtney v McCourtney, 205 Ark. Ill, 168 SW 
2d 200. 
Significant adverse affects have been found to impact 
upon children where child visitation has been limited. See a 
five year study entitled Child Protective Divorce Laws: A 
Response to the Effects of Parental Separation on Children, 
Family Law Quarterly, Volume XVIII, November 3, Fall 1983. 
VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
CHILD SUPPORT IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$325.00 PER CHILD PER MONTH 
The C o u r t below awarded t h e Responden t $325 .00 per 
month p e r c h i l d . T h i s was an a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n and a 
m i s a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e law as w i l l be s e t f o r t h below. 
The s t anda rd of review for c h i l d suppor t p roceed ings i s 
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that the decision of the trial court ma^ be set aside if the 
evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or if there has 
been an abuse of discretion. Christensen vs. Christensen, 628 
P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981). 78-45-7(2) of the Utah Code Annotated 
provides that in determining the amount ot child support to be 
paid, the court is to consider the following factors: 
(a) the standard of living ahd situation 
of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others. 
As will be seen from the record, the Court made no 
findings as to any of the factors listed above, and instead 
substituted its own formula for calculation of child support, 
(Record at 330) which calculation has no bksis in law and was an 
abuse of discretion. An examination of the record also reveals 
that the evidence presented did not justify the child support 
award which was granted. When the factors listed in Utah Code 
Annotated 78-45-7(2) are applied to the facits a much lower amount 
is mandated. 
The first factor to be considered in determining child 
support is the "standard of living and situation of the parties." 
The record reveals that the parties experienced an affluent 
lifestyle (R. at 413, 423, 428, 429, and 443, Defendant's Exhibit 
"2"). 
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The second factor to be considered in the determination 
of child support is the relative wealth and income of the 
parties. The record reveals that the Respondent was far 
wealthier than the Appellant and had far greater income than did 
the Appellant. 
The Respondent testified that her parents relieved her 
of any obligation to make a mortgage payment on the parties' 
residence (R. at 436), provided a school wardrobe for the oldest 
child (R. at 436) and contributed $9,056.00 towards the payment 
of the Respondents personal bills and paid over $3,000.00 in one 
month (R. at 446) for the purchase of the Respondent's own 
wardrobe. The Respondent testified that she did not have to work 
and had no qualms about quitting her job because she knew her 
parents would provide her with the income she needed (R. at 485). 
The Respondent also testified that her new residence to 
which she expected to move subsequent to the trial was worth 
$158,000.00 (R. at 465). Obviously the Respondent had a high 
standard of living and a large amount of discretionary funds, 
which is a key factor in determining the needs and income of the 
parties. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
The Appellant, on the other hand had a far lower 
standard of living. There was no dispute that the Appellant's 
base net monthly income the prior year, 1985, was approximately 
$1,500 as testified to by the Respondent (R. at 425) with bonuses 
ranging in gross amounts of between $5,000.00 to $10,000.00 
annually (R. at 426). 
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Although the Court found that th£ Appellant had a net 
income of $2,000.00 a month, his finding was erroneous based on 
the Appellant's testimony that his tax status had changed and 
would result in a lower take home pay than he was experiencing at 
the time of trial (R. at 611). 
A second ground on which the Colurt erroneously found 
the Appellant's net income to be $2,000.00 a month was his 
inclusion of the Appellant's company car as income to the 
Appellant. (Record at 330). The Appellant l(iad a company car, but 
although this may have reduced his expenses it did not change his 
income. 
Assuming a net income of substantially less than 
$2,000.00 per month, the Appellant was clearly in a worse 
financial situation than was the Respondent. The Appellant 
testified that he had expenses of $3,191.34 per month, and his 
testimony was unrefuted (R. at 132). In addition to the expenses 
included in that amount are additional expenses ordered by the 
Court for the benefit of the children (R. at 330, 331). The 
addition of expenses for life insurance and| medical insurance for 
the benefit of the children create further financial hardship for 
the Appellant. 
The Court has placed the Plaintiff in a position where 
his expenses exceed his income. The pourt in Hamilton v. 
Hamilton, 494 P.2d 287 (Utah 1972) stated that the Court may not 
place a burden upon the husband that he would "probably be unable 
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to meet in the future." The Court has done exactly that in the 
case at bar. 
In light of the above facts and the clear preponderance 
of the evidence that the Appellant made substantially less than a 
net amount of $2,000.00 a month, it was inequitable for the judge 
to require the Appellant to pay $325.00 per child per month in 
child support. The evidence was clear that the Respondent was in 
a far better financial situation than was the Appellant, 
therefore, the Court's ruling on child support was erroneous 
under Utah Code Annotated 78-45-7. 
The third and fourth factors mentioned in 78-45-7 
involve the ability of both parties to earn. The Appellant's 
earning ability has been discussed above. The Respondent was 
earning a gross amount of $10,800.00 per year, however, the 
Respondent had no need to work whatsoever since she was being 
supported by her parents (R. at 485). The Appellant's earning 
ability was obviously miscalculated and overstated by the judge 
which suggests that the amount of child support awarded by the 
judge should be reduced to reflect his actual net earnings as 
established by the record. 
The fifth factor to be considered in determining the 
amount of child support is the need of the obligee. No evidence 
was presented demonstrating the need of the Respondent and no 
consideration of this factor seems to have been given whatsoever. 
As stated above, the Respondent's testimony established that she 
had a much higher standard of living than did the Appellant. The 
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judge himself commented on the disparity between the parties when 
he said "I have a sneaking suspicion that these children are 
going to live better than he is," (R. at 3^3). As stated above, 
the Respondent testified that nearly every one of the children's 
financial needs were supplied by her parents including their 
clothing, their school tuition, the mortgage payments for their 
home and the car payment for their mother'^ car. The Respondent 
did not document their food, medical expenses or other expenses 
but lumped the same together with her own rather expensive dental 
work (R. at 449) and household expense^. In light of the 
Respondent's failure to demonstrate need it was clearly an abuse 
of discretion for the judge to award child support based on a 
formula combining the estimated future net income of the parties 
rather than the actual need of the Respondent. 
The final factors to be considered under U.C.A. 78-45-7 
are the ages of the parties and the responsibility of the obligor 
to support others; these factors are not relevant to the case at 
bar and since neither the Appellant nor the Respondent has an 
obligation to support others. 
Case law demonstrates the importance of applying the 
above factors to the situation of the parties. In the case of 
Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Uta|h 1985) the evidence 
demonstrated that the custodial parent ma<3e $32,000.00 per year 
and the non-custodial parent $7,000.00. The court found no need 
on the part of the custodial parent and therefore, made no award 
for the support of the three minor children). 
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In Graziano v. Graziano, 321 P.2d 931 (Utah 1958), the 
court considered the fact that the custodial parent was being 
supported by a wealthy family which provided for the needs of 
herself and the minor child of the parties, and awarded her only 
$50.00 per month in child support although she had no independent 
earning ability at the time. The non-custodial parent had a very 
low income and the court, considering the relative standard of 
lives so that the parties and their children can pursue their 
lives in as happy and useful a manner as possible. 
The Court continues on to say: 
If it appears that the decree is so 
discordant with the equitable allocation that 
it will more likely lead to further 
difficulties and distress than to serve the 
desired objective, then a reappraisal of the 
decree must be undertaken. 
Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871, 872 (Utah 1979). 
Such is the situation in the case at bar. Based on the 
Appellant's testimony that the children's needs amount to $300.00 
per month (R. at 583, the Court should reverse the lower court's 
ruling and modify the Court's award of child support from $325.00 
per month per child to $150.00 per month per child because the 
Court's award of child support was an abuse of discretion and 
should be overturned. 
The Court also erred in awarding alimony to the 
Respondent for the reasons set forth above that the Respondent 
was not in need of support from the Appellant to enable her to 
maintain the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage. 
Applying Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983) to the case 
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at bar we can see that the Court failed to apply the three 
factors set forth in the Savage, Supra case and the Respondent 
failed to prove need. Therefore, it was $rr to award alimony, 
even in a nominal amount. 
VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
MARITAL ASSETS OF THE PARTIES. 
The Court made several errors| in its division of 
assets, including its improper valuation of the assets, and its 
award of 97% of the estate to the Respondent-
The problem of valuation involves two sub-issues; first 
failure to make findings based on the evidence, and second, the 
Court's entry of findings which were against the clear 
preponderance of the evidence. 
The values of several major items and categories of 
items were disputed at trial. The Court pnade a ruling at the 
conclusion of the trial as to who the assets should be awarded to 
but the Court did not rule on the values of the items (R. at 
329). The Respondent's attorney prepared the Findings of Fact 
inserting in them his own values for the assets. When these 
figures were challenged by the Appellantj, the Court responded 
that "according to my notes, the numbers I think are correct." 
R. at 386. 
The numbers, in fact, are not codrect, and some of them 
are entirely unsupported by the evidencfe. The most blatant 
examples are the following: the household goods of the 
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Respondent were valued at $10,000.00 by the Respondent, Defen-
dants Exhibit "1". Yet the findings that the Court signed found 
these items to be worth $5,000.00 . On what basis did the judge 
find those items to be worth half of what the Respondent 
testified that they were worth? The record is devoid of any 
support for that figure. 
Another example is the Respondent's personal clothing 
and jewelry. She testified at trial it was worth $5,000.00 (R. 
at 101) yet the judge found they were worth zero, for which 
there is no basis. 
The obvious conclusion to be drawn here is that the 
Court actually paid very little attention to the evidence and 
simply divided the property without regard to its value. When 
specific valuations supplied by the Respondent were objected to 
by the Appellant, the Court conveniently found that the figures 
conformed to his notes. This was not proper and was clearly 
prejudicial to the Appellant as will be set forth below. 
The second issue as to valuation is whether the Court's 
findings as to the values of the assets were against the clear 
weight of the evidence. 
To begin with, the Court found the value of the 
property at 7389 South 1710 East known as the "marital residence" 
to be $129,000.00 based on the testimony of the Respondent that 
$129,000.00 was the purchase price (R. at 465). This was in 
spite of the fact that the Appellant testified that major 
improvements were made during the marriage of the parties (R. at 
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468, 469, 546, 547). The Appellant testified that in his opinion 
the property was worth $150,000.00 (R. at 546). The Appellant 
also testified that the parties had made only a few of the 
mortgage payments and that the house was ijn fact gifted to the 
parties entirely (R. at 429, 543 and 545). There was no dispute 
as to these facts, therefore it was against the clear 
preponderance of the evidence to find t;he property had not 
increased in value. 
The obvious conclusion to be drawn here is that the 
Court actually paid very little attention to the evidence and 
simply divided the property without regard to its value. When 
specific valuations supplied by the Respondent were objected to 
by the Appellant, the Court conveniently tiound that the figures 
conformed to his notes. This was not proper and was clearly 
prejudicial to the Appellant as will be set forth below. 
The second issue as to valuation lis whether the Court's 
findings as to the values of the assets were against the clear 
weight of the evidence. 
Another item which was disputed was the valuation of 
the property at the address of 7238 South 1(710 East known as "the 
Rental property." The Respondent testified that she felt it was 
worth $79,000.00 (R. at 472) although she expressed some doubt 
that the property would sell at that price ($79,000.00) when she 
stated "I felt like it would be good luck if we got that much 
($79,000.00) for it." (R. at 472). The Appellant testified that 
the property was worth $73,500.00 based on the offer he had 
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received (R. at 552). He also testified that the mortgage 
balance was $48,000.00 (R. at 553) while the Respondent listed it 
as $44,000.00 in her Exhibits (see Defendant's Exhibit 1), 
undervaluing the mortgage by $4,000.00. In addition the 
Appellant testified that an obligation of $25,000.00 existed 
against the rental property in favor of Al and Justine Porter (R. 
at 554). Although it was the Appellant's understanding at the 
time of the trial that the debt had been extinguished, he also 
testified that the understanding was oral only, and he had no 
document to prove the extinguishment of that debt (R. at 554). 
Therefore, the Appellant received the property subject to the 
spectre of a demand for $25,000.00. This was not disputed by the 
Respondent. Under these circumstances the Court should have 
reduced the value of the rental property by $25,000.00. In 
short, the value of the Rental property was overvalued by 
$34,500.00 which was prejudicial to the Appellant. 
The Court overvalued the Appellant's vested savings 
plan which the Plaintiff testified was worth $4,019.20 (R. at 
617). He produced a letter from the company (Defendant's Exhibit 
17) which stated that under the Appellant's savings plan he had 
$4,019.20 available and that the other funds shown on the Summary 
of Account (Defendant's Exhibit 16) were not vested, so not 
available for withdrawal. The letter from the Company, 
Defendant's Exhibit 17, is unambiguous and therefore, it was 
error for the Court to find the savings plan to be worth 
$9,466.00. 
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The Court undervalued the household furnishings in the 
possession of the Respondent which the Court valued at $5,000.00 
in its Findings of Fact (Record at 257). frhe Appellants total 
value for household goods was $31,000.0Q (R. at 555). The 
Respondent lumped everything together and assigned a purely 
arbitrary figure of $10,000.00 for the itefns. See Defendant's 
Exhibit 1. The Appellant's testimony as to the value of these 
items should be afforded more weight than the Respondent's 
testimony for several reasons: First of all the Appellant listed 
each item in detail, showing he had a greater familiarity with 
the household items than did the Respondent. Second, the 
Appellant testified that in placing a valu^ on the items in his 
Exhibit 15 he did some checking including fnaking phone calls to 
department stores (R. at 555) which the Respondent did not do. 
The Appellant demonstrated tfyat the Respondent's 
testimony lacked credibility. For example the Respondent 
submitted as Exhibit "8" her list of monthly expenses. Cross 
examination revealed that nearly all of the expenses listed were 
being paid by her parents (R. at 434, 435, 443, 444 and 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11). Also the Respondent listed her car 
expense at $400.00 per month although she dwned the car free and 
clear (R. at 443). 
The most revealing example of th^ Respondent's lack of 
candor was her statement that she had never seen the offer on the 
Rental property which document was intrbduced as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 13 (R. at 473). She repeatedly stated that there had 
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never been any written offer from the tenants, only oral offers 
(R. at 473, 474). Her counsel later admitted that the Respondent 
herself delivered the offer to Appellant's counsel (R. at 551). 
It is inconceivable in light of such blatant inconsistencies that 
Respondent's testimony and valuations should be afforded the same 
weight as the Appellant's. 
As stated previously the parties enjoyed a high 
standard of living. It is inconceivable that the furnishings of 
a house with five bedrooms, three and a half baths, formal living 
room, formal dining room, TV room, kitchen and laundry would 
contain furnishings worth only $10,000.00, let alone $5,000.00. 
The Court however, valued the Respondent's household 
furnishings at $5,000.00, a figure which was never suggested by 
either party and has no basis in the record (R. at 258). 
The Court also substantially overvalued the household 
possessions in the Appellant's possession. The Appellant 
testified that the only joint property in his possession was 
camera equipment, valued by the Court in its Findings of Fact at 
a zero value. (R. at 257). The Respondent, on the other hand 
submitted her Exhibit Ml" which makes the following conclusory 
statement: 
Household furnishings, fixtures, appliances, 
etc. in possession of Eddie Ebbert, including 
two book cases — est. $5,000.00 
No further details were offered by way of testimony or 
exhibits to support this figure. 
To find that the Appellant had $5,000.00 worth of joint 
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property in his possession was clearly against the preponderance 
of the evidence and was an abuse of discretion. 
From a reading of the Court's Ruling it seems that the 
Court did not consider dividing the property evenly because of 
the fact that it felt that "a overwhelming majority of the assets 
of the parties were a direct result of gifts from the Defendant's 
family." (R. at 329) However, this is not true according to the 
Defendant's Exhibit "2" the Respondent's parents contributed a 
total of $80,333.00 during the marriage. The Appellant would 
have had to earn only $10,000.00 per year (R. at 525) to equal 
what the Respondent's family contributed, and the evidence is 
clear that the Appellant made far more than $10,000.00 per year. 
Although the Court has considerable latitude in 
dividing the parties' assets, the Court abused its discretion in 
awarding 97% of the assets to the Respondeat. Case law does not 
support such a claim. 
Most commonly an award of more than 50% of the marital 
assets is made in lieu of alimony where a wife has supported the 
marriage as a homemaker and has no earning capacity. Workman v 
Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982), Beals v Beals, 610 P.2d 326 
(Utah 1980), King v. King, 717 P.2d 715 (1986). 
An award of more than 50% of the marital assets is also 
made for other equitable reasons. See Kerr v Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 
(Utah 1980), and Jesperson v Jesperson, 610, P.2d 326 (Utah 
1980). 
None of the factors listed in those cases as ground for 
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awarding a party more than 50% of the marital assets are relevant 
to the case at bar. 
In short there was simply no basis for the Court to 
award a majority of the assets to the Respondent. To do so was 
an abuse of discretion, extremely prejudicial to the Appellant 
and the Appellant is entitled to receive a judgment equal to his 
50% of the total marital assets in the amount of $90,740.00. 
IX. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD AWARD 
THE APPELLANT ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR 
THE APPEAL. 
Utah law provides that attroney's fees may be granted 
on the basis of reasonableness and need. Attorney's fees have 
been awarded where supported by evidence that one party is 
relatively more able to pay than the other party. For example, 
in Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2 1201 (Utah 1983) the court granted 
attorney's fees to the Plaintiff where the Plaintiff demonstrated 
need, and the Defendant demonstrated "realtive superiority of 
ability to pay." Savage at 1206. The facts stated above 
demonstrated that in the case at bar the Respondent is in a far 
better position to pay than is the Appellant and that the failure 
to prepare proper findings was that of the Respondent. 
Therefore, the Appellant should be awarded his fees herein. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons heretofore set forth either: 
1. Custody should be awarded to the Appellant and a 
new trial should be granted on the issues of support and property 
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division, or 
2. A new trial should be granted on all issues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //&• dfry of May, 1987. 
LAW)OFFICE OF LOWELL V. 
SUMMERHAYS 
Lowpll V. Summerhays^ 
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AFFIDAVIT OF KENN M. HANSON 
Case No. 860229-CA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, KENN M. HANSON, having been duly sworn do swear upon 
my oath and state as follows: 
1. That I am an attorney and a member of the Utah 
State Bar Association practicing law in the state of Utah. 
2. That I represented Appellant Eddie C. Ebbert at 
and prior to trial in the above captioned divorce proceeding in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
3. That I have personal knowledge of the comments and 
actions hereinafter described. 
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4. That the comments and actions of Judge Philip R. 
Fishier strongly suggested Court bias from the commencement of 
the Court proceedings and through the trial. 
5. That with respect to a hearing on one of the 
proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law the Court 
stated "I can't tell you how much my heart sank when I saw this 
case on my law and motion calendar". 
6. That during the course of the divorce proceeding 
there were numerous recesses called by the Court and subsequent 
meetings in chambers. 
7. That during one of those meetings and prior to 
trial, the Court made the comment regarding his proposed finding 
for custody and Respondent's proposed move out of state as 
follows: "She is going to have custody; that's the way it's 
gonna' be. I am not going to restrict her right to travel 
anywhere". 
8. That the Court explained his proposed judgment 
during the same meeting in chambers by referencing a custody 
award which had been made to the Court's bother's wife. 
9. That the Court further described his brother's 
case as one (like the instant case) where the wife took the 
children out of state after receiving custody. 
10. That the Court indicated to Affiant in this same 
meeting the opinion that his brother had no recourse to said 
move, and neither should the Appellant. 
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11. That there were times throughout the trial when 
the Court's gestures were not reflected on the record, but which 
gestures where indicative of the Court's.attitude and bias. 
12. That in one such demonstration the Court's 
gestures were so poignant as to coerce the Appellant to withdraw 
testimony regarding the children's physical health and to bring 
the trial to a premature end. 
13. That the specific instance hereinabove described 
(sans gestures) can be found in the trial transcript at record 
page 624, lines 6-18. 
14. That during the course of this discussion the 
Court gestured in a dramatic, overbearing and intimidating 
fashion, whereupon the Court came right out of the bench, 
extending his arm and pointing his finger a^ the Appellant. 
15. That the Court called a recess upon this outburst 
requesting Counsel to come into chambers. 
16. That in chambers the Court said "Barbara Ebbert 
may be a lot of things, but she's not a child abuser." 
17. That the Court further stated in that meeting: "I 
have to live with my decision. Go out in the hall and advise Ed 
about his next move." 
18. That the clear intent and Effect of this meeting 
in chambers was for the Court to get Affiant to make Appellant 
retract his statement. 
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19. That if called, Affiant would and could testify 
competently to the above described facts. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYTH NOT. 
? DATED this day of May, 1987 
Kenn M. Hanson 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
APPEARED BEFORE ME, Kenn M. Hanson stated that he is 
the signer of the foregoing affidavit and that the contents 
therein are true to the best of his knowledge, information and 
belief. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of May, 1986. 
My Commission Expires 
tfOTA 
Residing at 
*{Uti&'7/[J 
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AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT, do upon my oath swear 
and state as follows: 
1. That between the dates of September 15, 1986 
and May 9, 1987, my ex-wife Barbara Ebbert, has refused 
to allow me to visit with the children on fourteen (14) 
separate occasions. 
2. In December 1986 the plane fare alone for Christmas 
visitation cost me $588.00. 
3. That for me to travel to Colorado Springs, Colorado, 
by air; car rental, hotel room, food and visitation with 
the children, it would cost at least $250.00. 
/ / ^ 
DATED this //_ day of May, 1987. 
Eddie Clarence Ebbert 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this //day of May, 1987. 
My Commission Empires: 
Notary Publi 
Residing at: „ 5^rj£/' £%L&> (6^^tJ^,7 
!W 1 6 1986 
JAMES P. COWLEY (0739) 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BARBARA ANN EBBERT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA ANN EBBERT, 
Defendant. 
: FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. D 85-2144 
[ Judge Philip R. Fishier 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Philip R. Fishier, Judge of the above-entitled Court 
at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on Friday, November 8, 1985. The 
Plaintiff and Defendant were both present and were both repre-
sented by counsel. A stipulated settlement was reached between 
the parties on November 7, 1985, and the parties so advised 
the Court and they stated the Stipulation for the record. 
The parties were both sworn and examined, and exhibits were 
received. 
The parties were thereafter unable to agree upon the form 
and substance of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg-
H DiXonHindie>XlerK3roD^T Cour 
B
* — ^y)r\nO''\^ 
- l -
ment and Decree of Divorce, and upon motion of counsel for 
Defendant, the Stipulation was set aside and the matter was 
set for trial at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on Thursday, March 27, 
1986. 
The matter came on for trial on Thursday, March 27, 1986 
at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Philip R. Fishier, 
Judge of the above-entitled court. The parties were present 
in person and both were represented by their counsel. Witnesses 
were called and examined. Exhibits were received. The Court 
reviewed the matters on file, counsel for the parties made 
closing arguments and the Court now makes and enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant and Plaintiff are both actual and bona 
fide residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and were 
for more than three months immediately prior to the commence-
ment of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each other 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on June 19, 1976 and have 
since been husband and wife. 
3. Each party has treated the other cruelly, causing 
the other to suffer great mental pain, anguish and duress. 
4. Two children have been born the issue of the mar-
riage: Anne Ebbert, born February 14, 1980, and Amy Ebbert, 
born June 16, 1982. The Defendant is a good mother and a fit 
and proper person to have the care, custody and control of 
said two children. 
5. The Plaintiff is in good health, able-bodied and 
employed as a manufacturer's representative with net after 
tax earnings (including the leasehold value of a company-owned 
automobile furnished to the Plaintiff by his employer) of $24,000 
per year. 
6. The Defendant is in good health, able-bodied and 
is currently unemployed but has been employed and has certain 
skills and is expected to earn a net after tax income of $700 
per month. 
7. During the marriage, the parties have accumulated 
the following assets and incurred the following liabilities 
with a resulting net worth as indicate^: 
Assets : 
(a) Residence occupied by Barbara Ebbert 
at 7389 South 1710 East, fair 
market value of $129,000, less con-
tract balance of $85,000 $ 43,950 
(b) Rental property at 7238 South 
1710 East, fair market value 
$79,000, less mortgage balance 
of $44,000 and less tenant deposit 
of $500 34,500 
(c) Pots, pans, appliances, furniture 
and utility utensils located in 
residence occupied by Barbara 
Ebbert 5,000 
(d) Painting by Salvadore Dali 1,200 
(e) Camera equipment and projector -0-
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(f) Patio Furnishings 
(g) Garden Implements 
(h) Cash on hand with Barbara (approx.) 
(i) Eddie Ebbert*s vested savings plan 
with Allied Corporation as of 
9/30/85 
(j) Household furnishings, fixtures, 
appliances, etc. in possession 
of Eddie Ebbert, including two 
oak bookcases, etc. 
(k) Barbara Ebbertfs clothing, personal 
effects, jewelry, etc. 
(1) Eddie Ebbertfs clothing, personal 
effects, jewelry, etc. 
Liabilities: 
(a) Payable to Linnel McCullern for 
counseling - Barbara and Eddie 
(b) Account payable to Chalk Garden -
Barbara 
(c) Account due ZCMI - Eddie 
(d) Account due Weinstocks - Eddie 
(e) Account due Sears - Eddie 
(f) Account due Colletts - Eddie 
(g) Account due Arthur Frank - Eddie 
(h) Account due Mastercharge - Eddie 
(i) Account due Mountain Fuel - Eddie 
(j) Utah Power & Light - Eddie 
500 
250 
1,500 
9,466 
5,000 
-0-
-0-
$103,866 
$ 1,300 
1,900 
500 
500 
450 
1,500 
566 
1,500 
22 
65 
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1,200 
$ 10,175 
(k) Westminster College - Eddie 
(1) Repayable to Eddie's father - Eddie 
Total Assets $ 103,866 
Less Liabilities (10,175) 
Net Worth $ 93,691 
8. During the marriage, the Defendant's parents made 
cash gifts to the parties as follows: 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 (To 3/25/86) 
$ 
$ 
2,750 
2,627 
570 
1,417 
2,000 
11,000 
20,031 
41,700 
17,838 
3,500 
93,433 
9. The Defendant acquired the following assets prior 
to marriage or by way of gift during the marriage: 
(a) China from Barbara's grandmother 
(b) Gorham silver service acquired prior to marriage 
(c) China acquired prior to marriage 
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(d) Miscellaneous items of china, crystal and 
silver acquired prior to marriage 
(e) San franciscan crystal acquired prior to 
marriage 
(f) Crystal gifted to Barbara by her parents dur-
ing marriage 
(g) Oak table and chairs gifted by Barbara's parents 
(h) Office furniture, currently being utilized by 
Eddie, gifted by Barbara's father during 
marriage 
(i) VCR gifted to Barbara by her parents during 
marriage 
(j) 1981 Buick Skylark gifted by Barbara's father 
during marriage 
(k) Piano gifted to Barbara by her parents 
10. Since October of 1985, Barbara Ebbert has utilized 
resources provided by her mother and father to pay and discharge 
the following debts that were incurred prior to the separation 
of the parties: 
Utah Power & Light $ 115 
Salt Lake City Water 110 
Salt Lake City Sewer 143 
Taxes on the Residential Property 
occupied by Mrs. Ebbert 
Note payable to Continental Bank 
Account Payable to ZCMI 
Chalk Garden 
First Interstate Bank 
1,200 
3,500 
135 
800 
465 
-6-
Weinstocks 260 
Rowland Hall 2,063 
Mountain States Telephone 200 
AT&T 65 
Total $ 9,056 
11. The following debts remain unpaid: 
Chalk Garden $ 1,900 
Linnel McCullem for counseling 1,300 
Eddie's account with ZCMI 500 
Eddie's account with Weinstoc|ks 500 
Eddie's account with Sears 450 
Eddie's account with Collettsi 1,500 
Eddie's account with Arthur Ijrank 566 
Eddie's Mastercharge 1,500 
Eddie's Mountain Fuel account 22 
Eddie's Utah Power & Light account 65 
Eddie's account with Westminster 672 
Repayable to Eddie's father 1,200 
12. The Plaintiff and Defendant each inadvertently paid 
real property taxes on the property described in paragraph 
7(a) for calendar year 1985 in the amount of $1,200 each. The 
payment by the Plaintiff was in error and a duplicate pay-
ment, and the same should, upon application to Salt Lake County, 
be recovered. 
13. The Defendant currently resides in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, but is intending to move during the summer of 
1986 to Colorado Springs. 
14. The Plaintiff should enjoy reasonable but carefully 
defined rights of visitation with the two children who are 
issue of the marriage. 
15. Based upon the respective earnings of the parties 
as set forth in paragraph 5 and 6 above, a reasonable amount 
of child support to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant 
is $325 per month per child. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each party is entitled to and should be granted a 
Judgment and Decree divorcing that party from the other. The 
same should become final immediately upon the entry thereof. 
2. The care, custody and control of the two minor child-
ren who are issue of the marriage should be granted to Defen-
dant, reserving to the Plaintiff the right to visit said chil-
dren at all reasonable but well-defined times and places. The 
Plaintiff should be accorded his parental entitlements with 
respect to the minor children such as the right to attend parent-
teacher conferences and to receive notice of illness or injury 
to either of said children. 
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3. The Plaintiff should be required to pay to the Defen-
dant as child support for the use and benefit of the two minor 
children the sum of $325 per month for each of said children, 
with the first payment thereof being due on or before April 
1, 1986, and a like payment being due on or before the first 
day of each and every month thereafter, pending further order 
of the Court. 
4. In addition to the child support provided for in 
paragraph 3 above, the Plaintiff should provide the following 
additional support for the two minor children: 
(a) For so long only as the Plaintiff has a duty 
to support the minor children and for so long as the same 
is available to the Plaintiff through his place of employ-
ment, he should maintain full health and accident insurance 
coverage for the benefit and use of the two minor children, 
and they should be covered thereunder and thereby for 
all medical and hospital expenses and other health and 
accident coverage that is available to them through the 
Plaintiff !s insurance. To the extent that the children 
incur hospital, health and medical expenses that are not 
covered by the Plaintiff's insurance, the Plaintiff and 
Defendant should each be required to pay one-half thereof. 
(b) The Plaintiff should maintain insurance upon 
his life with death benefits payable to the Defendant 
as trustee for the use and benefit of the children to 
insure support for the children in the event of Plaintiff's 
death. The original amount thereof should be $100,000 
but may be reduced proportionate to the reduction of the 
Plaintiff's child support obligation. 
5. The Plaintiff should be required to pay the Defendant 
alimony of one dollar per year for a period of two years. 
6. There should be an equitable division of the assets 
accumulated during the marriage (giving consideration to the 
fact that a substantial portion of the assets resulted from 
gifts made by the Defendant's parents), and the Court should 
fix the responsibility for discharge of the outstanding obliga-
tions of the parties. 
7. The Plaintiff should be given the right to recover 
from Salt Lake County the duplicate payment of taxes upon the 
Salt Lake County property described in paragraph 7(a) above 
in the amount of $1,200. 
8. The parties should each be required to pay and dis-
charge their own attorney's fees and costs of court in this 
action. 
DATED this / S day of £/7tfO* 1986. 
BY TOE COURT: 
,MML 
TISHLER, DISTRICT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
kkputy CierK 
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JAMES P. COWLEY (0739) 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BARBARA ANN EBBERT 
Salt Lake Ci+y, Utah 
MA j^ l 6 1986 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDDIE CLARENCE EBBERT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BARBARA ANN EBBERT, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D 85-2144 
Judge Philip R. Fishier 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Philip R. Fishier, Judge of the above-entitled Court 
at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on Friday, November 8, 1985. The 
Plaintiff and Defendant were both present and were both repre-
sented by counsel. A stipulated settlement was reached between 
the parties on November 7, 1985, and the parties so advised 
the Court and they stated the Stipulation for the record. 
The parties were both sworn and examined, and exhibits were 
received. 
The parties were thereafter unable to agree upon the form 
and substance of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg-
-1-
ment and Decree of Divorce, and upon motion of counsel for 
Defendant, the Stipulation was set aside and the matter was 
set for trial at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on Thursday, March 27, 
1986. 
The matter came on for trial on Thursday, March 27, 1986 
at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Philip R. Fishier, 
Judge of the above-entitled court. The parties were present 
in person and both were represented by their counsel. Witnesses 
were called and examined. Exhibits were received. The Court 
reviewed the matters on file, counsel for the parties made 
closing arguments to the Court and the Court, having heretofore 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
now makes and enters its 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. Each party is given and granted a Judgment and Decree 
divorcing that party from the other. The same shall become 
final immediately upon the entry hereof. 
2. The care, custody and control of the two minor chil-
dren who are issue of the marriage is awarded to the Defendant, 
subject to the Plaintiff's parental rights, including but not 
limited to attending parent teacher conferences and including 
the right to receive immediate notice from the Defendant of 
any illness or injury of either one of said children. The 
Plaintiff is given and granted the right to visit with said 
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children at the times and places and subject to the terms and 
conditions relating thereto all as set forth in Exhibit A at-
tached to this Judgment and by this reference incorporated 
herein. 
3. The Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant as and for 
child support for the use and benefit of the two children who 
are issue of the marriage, the sum of $325 per month per child. 
Payments of $325 shall be made by the Plaintiff to the Defendant 
on or before April 1st and April 15, 1986 and on or before 
the 1st and 15th day of each month thereafter. 
4. In addition to the child support provided for in 
paragraph 3 above, the Plaintiff shall provide the following 
additional support for the minor children: 
(a) For so long only as the Plaintiff has a duty 
to support the minor children and for so long as the same 
is available to the Plaintiff through his place of employ-
ment, Plaintiff will maintain the parties' minor children 
on his health and accident insurance coverage. To the 
extent that the cost of medical and health care for the 
minor children exceeds and/or is not covered and not paid 
for by Plaintiff's health and accident insurance, then 
one-half of all amounts not paid for by said insurance 
shall be paid by the Plaintiff and the other one-half 
shall be paid by the Defendant. 
(b) The Plaintiff shall maintain insurance upon 
his life with death benefits payable to the Defendant 
(as trustee for the use and benefit of the children) in 
the original initial amount of $100,000, and the Plain-
tiff shall pay the premiums and other costs incident thereto 
and associated therewith. The Plaintiff is given and 
granted the right to reduce the coverage each year com-
mencing with calendar year 1987 with the reduction to 
be in proportion to the amount by which the Plaintiff 
has discharged his total child support obligations. This 
duty of the Plaintiff to provide such insurance is for 
the purpose of assuring the Defendant and the minor chil-
dren of resources alternative to child support in the 
event of the Plaintiff's death. 
5. The Defendant is awarded and the Plaintiff is ordered 
and directed to pay to her as alimony the sum of one dollar 
for calendar year 1986 and the sum of one dollar for calendar 
year 1987. The Plaintifffs duty to pay alimony shall terminate 
on December 31, 1987 unless the court has prior thereto extended 
or enlarged the same. 
6. The following described assets are awarded to the 
Plaintiff as his sole and separate property and free and clear 
of any right, title, and interest, claim or equity therein 
or thereto by the Defendant: 
(a) Rental property and its contents and fixtures 
located therein at 7238 South 1710 East, Salt Lake City, 
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Utah with a fair market value of $179,000, less a mort-
gage balance of approximately $44,000 with a net value 
of approximately $35,000 and subject to the cleaning de-
posit, advance rents and other deposits made by the tenants 
who are currently in possession of said property. 
(b) Camera equipment and projector. 
(c) All of the savings plans, stock options, profit 
sharing, pension plans and retirement benefits earned 
by the Plaintiff as a result of his employment with the 
Allied Corporation. 
(d) All of the household furnishings, fixtures, 
appliances, sporting equipment, tools and utensils in 
the Plaintiff's possession and including cash and certifi-
cates of deposit in his possession and including bookcases 
in his possession and including his clothing and personal 
effects that are still at the residence occupied by the 
Defendant and including a desk and Plaintiff's childhood 
books located at said residence. 
(e) A real property tax refund in the amount of 
$1,200 on the property identified in paragraph 7(a) below 
to the extent that said taxes were for calendar year 1985 
paid twice and to the extent that the Plaintiff can obtain 
from the taxing authorities a refund of the $1,200 dupli-
cate payment. (The Defendant shall cooperate with the 
Plaintiff with respect to this matter.) 
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7. The following described assets are awarded to Defen-
dant as her sole and separate property and free and clear of 
any right, title, interest, claim or equity therein or thereto 
by Plaintiff: 
(a) Real property at 7389 South 1710 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, more particularly described as a resi-
dence and lot, with a fair market: value of $129,000, and 
a contract balance of $85,050 with an equity of approxi-
mately $43,950. 
(b) The Defendant's clothing and her personal effects 
and jewelry and all of the household furnishings, fixtures, 
tools, equipment, art objects, garden tools, lawn mowers, 
silverware, crystal, china and personal property in pos-
session of the Defendant and/or located at the residence 
occupied by her and including all cash in her possession 
and all property that was accumulated prior to or during 
the marriage and not specifically and expressly identified 
and awarded to the Plaintiff pursuant to the provisions 
of paragraph 6 above. 
8. The Plaintiff shall pay and discharge the following 
obligations and shall save and hold the Defendant harmless 
therefrom. 
(a) Account balance at ZCMI 
(b) Account balance at Weinstocks. 
(c) Account balance at Sears. 
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(d) Account balance at Collects. 
(e) Account balance at Arthur Frank. 
(f) Mastercharge balance. 
(g) Mountain Fuel Supply acdount 
(i) Utah Power & Light account. 
(j) Account at Westminster College. 
(k) Amount payable to Plaintiff's father. 
(1) $650 of the $1,300 due and owing to Linnell 
McCullem. 
(m) The mortgage balance due on the property located 
at 7238 South 1710 East, together with all amounts, if 
any, due and owing to the rental tpenants who are currently 
in possession of said property. 
(n) All debts, liabilities ^nd charges incurred 
by the Plaintiff subsequent to the separation of the par-
ties in June of 1985 and not specifically herein required 
to be paid by the Defendant. 
(o) The attorney's fees incurred by the Plaintiff 
in this action and all costs and expenses incident thereto 
and associated therewith and resulting therefrom. 
9. The Defendant shall pay and discharge the following 
obligations and shall save and hold the Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
(a) $650 of the $1,300 due and owing to Linnell 
McCullem. 
(b) Account balance at Chalk Garden of $1,900. 
(c) The mortgage balance on the residence at 7389 
South 1710 East. 
(d) All debts, liabilities and charges incurred 
by the Defendant subsequent to the separation 
of the parties in June of 1985 and not specifi-
cally herein required to be paid by the Plain-
tiff. 
(e) The attorney's fees incurred by the Defendant 
in this action and all costs and expenses inci-
dent thereto and associated therewith and re-
sulting therefrom. 
10. If both parties agree, they may file joint federal 
and state income tax returns for calendar year 1985 and, in 
that event, the parties shall each pay one-half of any addi-
tional taxes that are due and, in the event of a refund, they 
shall divide the same evenly between them. If the parties 
do not agree upon such joint returns, then they may file sepa-
rate returns and, in that event, they shall be responsible 
for their own separate taxes and shall be entitled to their 
own separate refunds, if any. 
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11. The parties are ordered and directed to take the 
actions and execute and deliver documents necessary to imple-
ment this Judgment and Decree of Divorc^. 
DATED this /£ day of f^A^A , 1986  flttu* U 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
(•••••• K ^ / r U f l x o 
©eouty Clerk 
RICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
I herewith certify that I caused a true copy of the fore-
going JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE to be served upon: 
Kenn M. Hanson 
740 East 3900 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 
by mailing him a copy thereof, postage prepaid, on the -^ * 
day of April, 1986. pL^ 
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Exhibit A to the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
Civil No. D 85-2144 - Ebbert vs. Ebbert 
Plaintiffs Visitation Rights 
With Respect to the Two Minor Children 
Custody of Which Has Been Awarded to the Defendant 
While the Defendant is still residing in Utah 
and prior to her permanent relocation to Colorado, 
the Plaintiff shall be entitled to visit with the children 
on alternate weekends, commencing at 5:00 p.m. on Friday 
evening and continuing to 6:00 p.m. on Sunday evening, 
with the Plaintiff to have the liberty of taking the chil-
dren with him during that time period. The Plaintiff's 
first weekend of the described visitation shall be the 
weekend commencing April 11, 1986. 
The Defendant shall have the children available to 
be picked up by the Plaintiff at the designated time and 
on the weekends scheduled. The Plaintiff shall pick up 
the children and return them as scheduled. If, for any 
reason, the Plaintiff does not or cannot: exercise the 
visitation for any specified weekend, the Plaintiff shall 
give the Defendant notice thereof not later than 6:00 
p.m. on the Wednesday preceding the Friday when the sched-
uled visitation is to commence. If the Plaintiff gives 
the Defendant such notice, then, unless the Defendant 
agrees otherwise, the Plaintiff shall have forfeited his 
visitation for the entire weekend. If the Plaintiff fails 
to give such notice of cancellation and also fails to 
appear before 5:30 p.m., then, unless Defendant agrees 
otherwise, the Plaintiff shall have forfeited his visita-
tion rights for the entire weekend. 
After the Plaintiff and the minor children have relo-
cated in Colorado (expected during the summer of 1986), 
the Plaintiff's right to visit with said children shall 
be as follows and is subject to the express terms herein: 
(a) Thursday and Friday of Thanksgiving weekend 
for calendar year 1986 and the same two days on each 
even numbered calendar year thereafter. 
(b) Saturday and Sunday of Thanksgiving weekend 
for calendar year 1987 and the same two days on each 
odd numbered calendar year thereafter. 
(c) Pre-Christmas holidays for calendar year 
1986 and for each even numbered calendar year there-
after. Pre-Christmas holidays is defined to mean 
Exhibit A to the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
Civil No. D 85-2144 - Ebbert vs. Ebbert 
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a period of time commencing at 6:00 p.m. on the second 
day after the beginning of the children's Christmas 
vacation and continuing to 12:00 noon on Christmas 
Day. 
(d) Post-Christmas holidays for calendar year 
1987 and for each odd numbered calendar year there-
after. Post-Christmas holidays is defined to mean 
a period of time commencing at 12:00 noon on December 
25th and continuing to 7:00 p.m. on December 31st. 
(e) Easter weekend in calendar year 1987 and 
on each odd numbered calendar year thereafter. East 
weekend is defined to mean from 6:00 p.m. on Friday 
evening before Easter through 7:00 p.m. on Easter 
Day. 
(f) During Colorado's Education Association 
recess (if any) in 1987 and in each odd numbered 
calendar year thereafter. The Colorado Education 
Association school recess is defined to be a period 
commencing at 6:00 p.m. on the first day of the recess 
and ending at 7:00 p.m. on the day prior to the day 
school resumes. 
(g) President's Day, which is defined to mean 
a period of time commencing at 6:00 p.m. on the day 
before President's Day and terminating at 7:00 p.m. 
on President's Day. 
(h) Memorial Day, which is defined to mean 
a period of time commencing at 6:00 p.m. on the day 
before Memorial Day and terminating at 7:00 p.m. on 
Memorial Day. 
(i) The children's birthdays in calendar year 
1986 and on even numbered calendar years thereafter. 
The birthday visitation is defined to mean a period 
of time commencing at 6:00 p.m. on the day prior 
to the children's birthdays and ending at 7:00 p.m. 
on the children's birthdays. 
(j) Summer vacation, which is defined to mean 
a period of time commencing at 6:00 p.m. on July 
3rd and terminating at 7:00 p.m. oil July 25th. If, 
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and to the extent the Plaintiff exercises his rights 
to summer vacation for both children for the full 
period of time herein set forth, then the child sup-
port for each of said children for the month of July 
otherwise due and owing by the Plaintiff to the Defen-
dant shall be reduced by one-third for said month. 
(k) Father's Day weekend which is defined to 
be a time period commencing at 6:00 p.m. on the Friday 
before Father's day and ending at 7:00 p.m. on Father's 
Day. 
With respect to visitation after the Plaintiff and 
minor children have relocated in Colorado, the Plaintiff 
may exercise the visitation rights described above in 
either Colorado or Utah, subject to the following terms 
and conditions: 
(a) If the Plaintiff picks the children up 
at the Defendant's residence, he must do so promptly 
at the hour of 6:00 p.m. on the scheduled day and 
must return them promptly at the hour of 7:00 p.m. 
on the scheduled day. If the Plaintiff intends to 
pick the children up at their place of residence 
in the Colorado Springs area, then he shall give 
the Defendant written notice two weeks in advance 
of the scheduled commencement of the visitation period. 
(b) The Plaintiff may exercise his right of 
visitation in Salt Lake City, Utah, and the Defendant 
shall permit the children to be transported by a 
common carrier to Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(i) The common carrier transport must 
be proper and suitable for transporting the 
children, given their ages. 
(ii) The Plaintiff must be present at the 
children's arrival in Salt Lake City, Utah to 
greet them and care for them upon their arrival. 
(iii) The Plaintiff must provide to the 
Defendant prepaid tickets for utilization by 
the children in traveling to Salt Lake City, 
Utah. The prepaid tickets must be provided 
by the Plaintiff to the Defendant not later 
than ten days prior to the date upon which the 
visitation is scheduled. 
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(iv) The transportation must be so arranged 
by the Plaintiff that the children will arrive 
in Salt Lake City, Utah not earlier than 6:00 
p.m. and not later than 10:00 p.m. on the first 
day of the scheduled visitation and be returned 
to the Defendant in Colorado Springs, Colorado 
not later than 7:00 p.m. on the concluding day 
of the visitation. 
(v) If suitable transportation for the 
children is not available direct from Colorado 
Springs to Salt Lake City, Utah then the Defen-
dant shall, at her cost and expense, be respon-
sible for placing the children on the common 
carrier in Denver Colorado for direct transpor-
tation to Salt Lake City, Utah. If return trans-
portation is not available direct from Salt 
Lake City to Colorado Springs, then the Defen-
dant shall be responsible for meeting the chil-
dren in Denver and transporting them from there 
to Colorado Springs. 
(vi) All transportation arranged by the 
Plaintiff must be reasonable with respect to 
the children's ages, and the Defendant is not 
expected to subject the children to any unnec-
essary and unreasonable transportation risks. 
(vii) The Plaintiff shall keep the Defen-
dant fully informed and advised as to all arrange-
ments with respect to visitation, including 
date and time of pickup, date and time of return, 
an itinerary of where the children will be, 
including addresses and phone numbers where 
they may be reached by the Defendant during 
the entire visitation period. 
In addition to the visitation herein above set forth, 
the Defendant shall cooperate with the Plaintiff in accom-
odating free and open communication by the Plaintiff with 
the children through the use of telephones, telegrams 
and mail. 
The Plaintiff may visit with the children in Colorado 
on dates other than as specifically scheduled upon giving 
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the Defendant two weeks written notice of Plaintiff's 
intended additional visitation with the children, and 
such visitation shall be limited to afternoon and evening 
visits and overnight visits of not more than one night 
and provided that the visitation shall not interfere with 
the children's school and provided further that this addi-
tional visitation may not be exercised more frequently 
than 24 hours in any month. 
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, 
the Plaintiff may not exercise any visitation rights at 
such times as will in any way interfere with the children's 
schooling. 
The Plaintiff may exercise visitation rights other 
than as herein expressly set forth only with the prior, 
express approval and agreement of the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff is expected to exercise the visitation 
rights herein granted to him in a reasonable and respon-
sible fashion. If the children are ill or if there are 
other valid reasons why the Defendant believes a particular 
visitation is not in the best interest of the children 
or will be hazardous or threatening to their physical 
or mental health, then the Defendant may decline the visita-
tion rights by giving reasonable written notice thereof 
to the Plaintiff and setting forth the reasons therefor. 
Neither party shall, by their words, conduct, act 
or otherwise express, intimate or indicate any derrogatory, 
defamatory or denigrating remark about the other parent. 
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